This paper analyses the contract-posting equilibrium in a general equilibrium matching model of the labour market with on-the-job turnover. Privately optimal contracts have a rising wage-tenure profile, even when productivity is constant. The effect is to reduce equilibrium turnover; when jobs differ in productivity, turnover is below the level required for efficient matching of workers to jobs. Contracts with a rising wage-tenure profile can be interpreted as a form of monopsonistic price discrimination. Credit constraints, or institutions that limit firms' ability to price discriminate, can improve the efficiency of matching.
Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market:
Firms' Strategies for Recruitment and Retention
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate the choice of employment contract by firms in a frictional labour market, and to demonstrate the implications of their choices for labour turnover and the efficiency of the market in allocating labour resources. When there are matching frictions, the time costs for workers and firms of finding alternative partners endow each existing relationship with a match rent. The typical assumption in general equilibrium search and matching models is that the sharing of the rent is determined through bilateral bargaining under conditions of symmetric information (as in, for example, Pissarides, 1990) . Alternatively, in the wage-posting model (Diamond, 1971; Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) , firms are assumed to possess all the bargaining power and "post" the wage that they will pay; individual workers observe the wage when they meet the firm, and decide whether to work there.
The main application of these models has been to the analysis of unemployment and macroeconomic policy (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) . However, search and matching models provide a natural environment for investigating microeconomic issues of wage and contract determination. One of the primary functions of an employment contract is to regulate turnover when asymmetries of information make bilateral bargaining infeasible. In a standard two-period partial equilibrium model (Hall and Lazear, 1981) a single worker and firm choose a contract in the first period to maximise their joint expected surplus, with uncertain, but exogenously determined, alternative opportunities in the second period. The outcome is by definition constrained-efficient. But in a dynamic general equilibrium matching model we can investigate how the decisions of individual firms and workers affect the operation of the labour market as a whole. The choice of contract in one match affects the probability that the match will break up, and hence the likelihood that other matches will form. From the perspective of the firm, the optimal strategy for recruitment depends on other firms' strategies for retention, and vice-versa.
The interaction of these strategies determines labour turnover, and the allocation of labour resources.
In this paper we consider a labour market with matching frictions, in which the productivity of a match is known with certainty. Firms can post general contracts, which workers accept or reject. Workers can move from one firm to another if offered a better contract. In this environment it is not optimal simply to post a wage, even if match productivity is constant. Optimal contracts for the firm have low value to the worker initially, and higher value subsequently: a rising wage-tenure profile. Although there may be many optimal contracts, we show that they are all equivalent in their implications for equilibrium turnover to a simple "step-contract", in which the wage is initially at the lowest level acceptable to the worker, and then steps up to the level of productivity. This result is used to determine equilibrium turnover for two particular cases. First, when all jobs are identical, there is no turnover in equilibrium. (This is in contrast to the result of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) who show that in the wage-posting equilibrium there is wage dispersion and turnover). In this case, wage-tenure contracts may enhance both private and social efficiency by avoiding wasteful turnover costs. In the second case, jobs differ in productivity. Then, the use by firms of a rising wage-tenure profile, while privately optimal, inhibits efficient matching: turnover is below the socially optimal level.
The adoption by firms of policies linking wages and tenure is a central element of the descriptive theory of internal labour markets (ILMs) (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) , characterised by low mobility, with limited, low-level, ports of entry to firms, and welldefined career paths within firms. There are few formal models, but the primary rationale for ILMs is usually supposed to be specific investment (Wachter and Wright,1990) .
Interpretations differ (Ulman,1992) : one view is that "inflexible" wage structures emerge in firms insulated from market forces, that these are reinforced by "convention", and should be regarded as impediments to efficient employment. Wachter and Wright, in contrast, emphasise that the contractual arrangements in ILMs can be interpreted as efficient responses to specificity and information problems: "the ILM exists because it furthers the utility and profit maximising goals of the parties". The model developed here contributes to this debate, in that the equilibrium contracts can be interpreted as ILM strategies. They arise from conditions of less than perfect competition; they are privately optimal; and they have both costs and benefits for labour market efficiency.
Related Theory and Evidence
Labour contracts specifying a low wage for an initial period, then subsequently the standard wage for the job, are a common device, particularly for unskilled jobs. Manning (2000) , in a study of recruitment to low-wage jobs by five British firms, found that recruits could expect (on average) to wait 21 weeks before receiving a first pay-rise of 6%. Andrews, Bradley and Upward (1999) , studying the youth labour market in Lancashire, were able to record "advertised wage growth" for 29% of their sample of jobs. Amongst jobs that did not provide any training, average advertised wage growth was 17% during the first year. For higher level jobs, large firms often use an incremental pay scale, with new employees entering at a low point, and receiving wage increments at regular predetermined intervals until they reach the top of the scale.
There are two established theoretical explanations for such contracts: that they reflect the acquisition of specific human capital (Hashimoto, 1981) , or delayed compensation as the solution to a shirking problem (Lazear, 1981) . The interpretation offered in this paper has more in common with the specific capital model (since match rents can be regarded as specific capital), but differs in two important ways. First, rising wage-tenure profiles are used even when productivity remains constant throughout the duration of a match. Second, they may be detrimental to market efficiency.
In many labour market models, including shirking models, the first-best solution to the contracting problem is a lump-sum transfer from worker to firm, followed by a constant wage. Such arrangements are rarely observed, and it is sometimes argued that rising wage-tenure profiles are a second-best alternative if, for example, employees are credit-constrained. This hypothesis has been very little explored, and proponents of efficiency wage models have typically claimed that slowly rising wages cannot solve the efficiency wage problem 2 . In this paper we identify a second-best contract precisely, and examine its implications.
The model developed here is based on the random matching model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) 3 , which represents a significant innovation in the search and matching literature, in that employed workers may receive alternative job offers. We differ from Burdett and Mortensen in allowing firms to post general contracts rather than constant wages, and obtain different results. Another paper that allows firms to use general contracts in a general equilibrium matching model is Shimer (1996) . His focus is on equilibrium unemployment and the efficient response to negative productivity shocks, and there is no job-to-job turnover. Consequently equilibrium contracts are very different from those in this paper 4 ; also, since there are no information asymmetries between the contracting parties, the equilibrium achieves full private and social efficiency.
The Model
There is a mass of identical workers and a mass of firms each of measure one.
Over time, workers and firms meet each other at Poisson rate λ, which is independent of whether they are currently matched. A firm can match with several workers simultaneously, but a worker must terminate any existing match in order to enter a new one. Workers exit from the labour market (retire) at Poisson rate µ, again independent of employment status, and are replaced by new workers who are initially unemployed.
An unemployed worker has flow utility equal to b, which is constant across workers. The firm incurs a turnover cost s≥0 when establishing a new match; this can be interpreted as an initial specific training cost. Thereafter, the worker has flow productivity p>b, remaining constant over time. p and s may vary between firms; the distribution of (p,s) has bounded support 5 .
On meeting a worker, the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract. We assume that contracts must permit either party to terminate the relationship at any time.
Workers and firms maximise the expected present value of income, and a worker moves from one match to another if and only if he is made strictly better off. We will make the convenient (but not substantive) assumption that an unemployed worker will accept an offer when he is indifferent between the contract and unemployment.
Symmetric Information and Efficiency
Suppose that, when a firm and worker meet, and throughout the duration of a match, each party knows everything relevant about the other. On meeting, they both observe the flow productivity of the match, p, and the firm observes whether the worker is currently matched, and, if so, his current productivity and the details of his current contract. Subsequently, they both observe alternative potential matches encountered by the worker.
Under these conditions there is a multiplicity of strategies available to firms who can make take-it-or-leave-it contract offers, all of which lead to the same employment decisions in equilibrium, and all of which enable the firms to extract the rents: they are perfectly-price-discriminating monopsonists. With "offer-matching", for example, the firm initially offers a wage just sufficient to attract the worker (if it is able to do so) and then matches any subsequent offers, again if possible, with a wage sufficient to retain him.
Alternatively, the firm could offer a wage equal to productivity, and then set an entry fee just small enough to induce the worker to accept. These, and many alternative strategies, support equilibria that are socially efficient: that is, workers change jobs if and only if they become more productive by doing so; hence total output is maximised, subject to the constraints imposed by the matching frictions. 
Information Assumptions and Game Structure
In the following analysis we suppose instead that, when a worker meets a firm, the firm does not observe the worker's existing contract, if any, or whether he is employed.
Furthermore, the worker's current employer does not observe the offer made by an alternative employer, or even that a meeting is taking place.
The effect of these assumptions is that the firm cannot distinguish between workers at the time of meeting so must offer the same contract to all workers. Since it does not observe subsequent meetings, nothing in the contract can be contingent on such meetings occurring. In fact the only verifiable quantities and events upon which the arrangements in the contract can be contingent are the worker's tenure in the job, and the termination of the match by either party.
Given the dynamic nature of the model the firm may want to change its contract offer as the distribution of workers over jobs changes. However, like Burdett and
Mortensen, we will focus only on the steady-state. The model is analysed as a one-shot game, in which each firm chooses its contract-offer strategy at the beginning of time.
There may be an initial period in which the distribution of workers over jobs changes, until it reaches a steady-state, but firms do not discount the future, so they choose strategies that maximise their steady-state profits. 
The Firm's Choice of Contract
The maximum initial value of the match is J*(p)-s. The value to a worker of remaining in
When a relationship is governed by a contract, the worker and firm optimise individually within the framework provided by the contract, so the maximum joint value J*(p)-s is not necessarily achieved. Let J 0 (C)≤J*(p)-s be the initial joint value of the match with a contract C, and V 0 (C) be the initial value to the worker. The initial value to the firm is then J 0 -V 0 .
Now consider the firm's choice of contract offer when the exogenous probability of acceptance of an offer worth v to the worker is P(v). Again, P will be endogenously determined in general equilibrium. Here we assume that P is non-decreasing, that P(V u -)=0, and that P is left-continuous above V u ; given the assumptions about workers' behaviour, these properties must hold in equilibrium. The firm's problem can be expressed: 
The intuition here is that by setting an acceptance fee A the firm can freely determine the worker's valuation V 0 without affecting the joint value of the match. So an optimal strategy is to maximise the joint value by ensuring that the worker receives the whole surplus expost and hence makes efficient quit decisions, then to use the fee to extract part of the surplus ex-ante. Effectively, the firm uses the fee to separate its recruitment strategy from its retention strategy.
It is clear that this is not the only contract that is optimal for the firm. First, it is straightforward to show that exactly the same effect 7 can be achieved with a contract without an initial fee, but with a lower wage w=p-µA* and a quitting fee A* paid by the worker to the firm if he leaves. Second, depending on the distribution of offers by other firms, F, it may be possible to use a low initial wage instead of an acceptance fee. We consider such alternative contracts in 3.3 and 4. below.
Note that for the firm to make positive profit, it is necessary that J*(p)-s≥ J*(b), and this condition depends on the distribution F. If the condition does not hold, the firm cannot do better than to offer a contact with A=s and w=p, which would not be accepted by the worker.
Note also that for the contract in Proposition 1 to be optimal, the firm must be able to commit to paying the wage w in the event of employment. Without this the firm would have an incentive to lower the wage ex-post, knowing that time will elapse before the worker receives an alternative offer.
Restricted Contract Choice
In practice, the firm may be restricted in its choice of contract instruments: use of entry fees or very low wages might be ruled out because workers are credit constrained, or by legislation; similarly quitting payments, as a form of bonding, may be illegal. We now examine the firm's choice of contract when it is unable to use any instantaneous fees, and there is a lower bound on the wages acceptable to workers. The firm can, however, make wages contingent upon the worker's tenure, T, in the match. Assume as before that the firm can commit to a future wage profile; since it learns nothing ex-post that affects its valuation of the relationship, it prefers to specify wages ex-ante, and we will suppose that the courts will enforce such contracts.
Thus we assume that the firm is able to choose any wage-tenure profile w(T)
satisfying the following conditions:
is continuous, except possibly at a finite number of points, at which it is rightcontinuous;
(ii) w(T)≥c for all T, where c≤b;
c, the lower bound on wages, cannot be greater than the flow utility of unemployment b.
Condition (iii)
, that the wage must eventually be constant, is not restrictive, but helps to ensure the existence of the value functions in what follows.
Consider a match for which a contract C corresponding to w(T) has been signed and the match tenure is T≥0. Let J(T;p;w) be its joint continuation value to the firm and worker, assuming that they will make individually optimal decisions in the future.
Similarly let V(T;w) be its value to the worker. The value of the match to the firm is J-V.
Van den Berg (1990) establishes the existence and properties of the value functions for this type of non-stationary problem. Given the assumptions about the form of the contract, J and V are continuous and right-differentiable functions of tenure, T. For the worker and the firm to be willing to remain in the match requires:
While conditions (3) hold, the functions J and V satisfy:
The initial joint value of the match is J 0 (C)= J(0;p,w)-s, and the worker's initial value is
In the unrestricted case in section 3.1, an optimal strategy involves setting the wage to maximise the joint value of the match and optimise retention, and an acceptance fee to optimise recruitment. This idea can be extended to cover the restricted case. We can try to separate the optimisation problem (2) into two steps as follows:
Problem (6) is to find a wage profile that maximises the joint value of the match, given that the contract must have a particular initial value v to the worker. Problem (7) is to choose this initial value optimally. To show that this separation is legitimate, we need to prove that (6) has a solution for any feasible initial value v.
A contract analogous to the "fee-plus-constant-wage" that is optimal in the unrestricted case would be a wage equal to c (the lowest acceptable wage) for some initial period, and subsequently equal to productivity. The lower is c, the more closely this contract can approximate the one with the entry fee. Contracts of this type, both in the restricted and unrestricted cases, will be referred to as step-contracts. We will show that step-contracts are optimal in the restricted case too.
Let ~( ;~) V T T be the value to the worker at tenure T of a step-contract in which the wage rises from c to p at tenure T . Then ~( ) V T satisfies: Intuitively, it is clear that the value of a step-contract increases as tenure approaches T . Since tenure relative to this moment is what matters, it follows that by varying T it is possible to choose any initial value for a step-contract.
LEMMA 1:
PROOF: See appendix.
The wage and value profiles for a step-contract are shown in Figure 1 .
, there is a uniquely-defined step-contract S (v,p,c) with initial value v to the worker.
PROOF: The initial value of a step-contract
Hence, using Lemma 1,
0 is continuous and strictly decreasing in T , with
, the contract has w=c for ever. ! So the firm can always find a step-contract for any feasible initial value v: workers will not accept contracts of lower value than J*(c), and the firm would make negative profit with a value higher than J*(p). Moreover, for given v, the step-contract is optimal:
The intuition for this result is that with a step-contract the value to the worker rises as fast as possible with tenure, for a given initial value. This minimises the probability that the worker will accept an alternative offer of lower value than the current match, and hence maximises the joint value of the match. It is now trivial to prove:
If there is any acceptable contract that gives non-negative profit for the firm, there exists a step-contract S(v*, p,c) that is optimal.
PROOF: Let C be a contract with
Hence C cannot give higher payoff than this step-contract. !
A General Equilibrium Result
We have now established that there is always, whether or not the form of contracts is restricted, a step-contract that is optimal for the individual firm. However, there may be alternative contracts that are also optimal. The alternative contracts available to the firm are, in the restricted case, other wage profiles w(T), and in the unrestricted case contracts consisting of an initial fee A and a wage-tenure profile w(T) 8 . For the individual firm, an alternative contract can be optimal only if its initial value and retention properties are the same as those of an optimal step-contract. The following result holds in both the restricted and unrestricted cases:
LEMMA 4: If C is an optimal contract with initial value to the worker V 0 (C), and value profile V(T), then the step-contract with the same initial value, and value profile ~( ) V T , is also optimal, and the probability of the worker leaving is the same at all times in both
This result suggests that if we are interested in how the labour market allocates resources in equilibrium, we can restrict attention to equilibria in which firms use step-contracts.
Proposition 3 confirms this intuition:
PROPOSITION 3: For any Nash equilibrium in contract offers, there exists an equivalent Nash equilibrium in offers of step-contracts, in which all turnover decisions are identical.
We now apply this result to analyse equilibrium turnover, first when all firms are identical (Section 4), and then when there are two types of firm (Section 5).
Homogeneous Firms
Suppose that all firms have identical productivity p and recruitment costs s, satisfying p-µs>b (employment has strictly higher social value than unemployment).
8 Other lump-sum payments, such as a quitting fee, are possible but redundant.
Burdett and Mortensen show, for the case of no turnover costs (s=0), that if firms are restricted to offering a constant wage there is no equilibrium in which they all offer the same wage. It is easy to see why: first, if all firms offer a particular wage below p, a firm offering a slightly higher wage will attract a much larger supply of workers, while hardly losing any of its profit on each worker; and if all firms offer a wage p (making zero profit), a firm offering a slightly lower wage will still attract unemployed workers, and will make positive profit. The unique equilibrium has a continuous distribution of wages. Firms effectively randomise over wages; they obtain equal payoffs from a low wage, with correspondingly high turnover, and from a higher wage and lower turnover. Burdett and
Mortensen do not consider turnover costs; however, the argument above extends to this case: even when s>0, there is no equilibrium in which firms offer the same wage, so any equilibrium must involve job-to-job turnover, which is necessarily inefficient.
But if firms are able to vary wages with tenure, there can be no equilibrium of this type. When the wage is constant over time, the value of the contract to the worker remains constant over time also. By varying the wage the firm can make an offer that has the same initial value to the worker as any constant wage, but an increasing value while he remains with the firm. This means that, for given strategies of other firms, the firm can maintain the same level of recruitment, while increasing the retention rate. The effect is to eliminate turnover between jobs.
To prove this we can, by Proposition 3, restrict attention to equilibria in which firms offer step-contracts. First note that if the unemployment rate is u, workers enter unemployment at rate µ(1-u) and leave at a rate ≤λu, depending on offers. So in steady state there is a positive measure of unemployed workers u ≥ + µ µ λ / ( ) . If firms can make positive profits in equilibrium, all firms will make offers that are acceptable to the unemployed, so workers will leave unemployment at rate λu, and u = + µ µ λ / ( ) .
Equilibrium in Unrestricted Step-Contracts
When firms are able to use entry fees, it is obvious that there can be no turnover in equilibrium. A step-contract has V(T)= J*(p) for all T. So no firm can make an offer acceptable by employed workers, and V(T)=p/µ. It follows immediately that the unique equilibrium is for firms is to use an entry fee so that V 0 =V u , attracting unemployed workers only, in which case V 0 =V u = b/µ. Workers stay until retirement, and firms capture all the match rent.
Equilibrium in Restricted Step-Contracts
The zero-turnover result is less obvious with restricted step-contracts, since the firm is vulnerable to outside offers during the initial period. First note that in an equilibrium in which all firms face the same restrictions, all workers will have stepcontracts with the same c and p. An employee's reservation value depends only on his tenure relative to the moment when the step-up occurs, R T T ≡ −~. So we can describe all workers by their current relative tenure, and look for an equilibrium in offers of relative tenure.
Define R u as the value of relative tenure at which the step-contract has the same value as unemployment 9 ,
Then define H as the steady-state distribution of
, and G as the probability that a worker will accept an offer of
. H is increasing and right-continuous, but may have mass points where H(R)> H(R-). G(R)
is the stock of workers with current relative tenure less than or equal to R, so we can evaluate the steady-state G for given H by equating the flows of workers entering and leaving this stock:
LEMMA 5: The steady-state distribution of tenure G(R) is continuous and has rightderivative: (4) and (5):
No firm will offer R R > , which is the point at which Y=s if the worker never quits 10 , so H R ( ) . = 1 The firm's payoff from an offer R is: Π = − ( ( ) ) ( ) Y R s G R ; using Lemma 5 and (9) we can find the optimal choice of R. In the proof of Proposition 4, we show there can be no-job-to-job turnover by proving that in any plausible equilibrium, H has a single mass point of mass one. We then prove the existence of equilibria of this type.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose all firms are identical, with p-µs>b, and the same restrictions, c, on contracts. Then:
In any equilibrium in contract offers in which firms make strictly positive profits, all offers have the same initial value and there is no job-to-job turnover.
(ii) It is an equilibrium for all firms to offer a step-contract of the same initial value V 0 if and only if V V V 0 ∈[ , ] where: With turnover costs and credit constraints, firms face particular problems: they must incur the initial cost, and need to retain the worker for a long time at a wage c in order to recoup the cost. In this case there are multiple equilibria, which when s and c are both high may include inefficient equilibria with turnover, although we may argue that these are implausible. They require a mass of exactly α firms to make an offer giving the whole match surplus to the worker. α is such that firms making a lower offer also make zero profits because the value to the firm of a potentially longer period at a low wage is exactly offset by the probability that the worker will leave. These equilibria are unstable in the sense that a small increase in the mass offering V H would lead all firms to deviate to V H , which would also be an equilibrium. Similarly a decrease in the mass at V H would lead all firms to deviate to an offer of V L or lower.
Proposition 4 completely characterises the equilibria in step-contracts. When restrictions are low, or absent, the equilibrium offer has value V 0 =b/µ. When c is higher, the equilibrium offer is higher too. Firms cannot use very low wages, and need to raise the wage quickly to deter turnover, so the contract has higher value to workers: credit constraints effectively give workers some bargaining power, and thence allow them to capture some of the match rent.
Solving equation (4) we can obtain the length of the initial low wage period:
It can then be verified that credit constraints reduce the "slope" of equilibrium wage profiles, where "slope" means the jump in the wage, relative to the waiting time: (p-c)/T . Equally intuitively, a reduction in frictions (an increase in the meeting rate λ) increases the equilibrium V 0 , and hence reduces the waiting time and increases the slope.
Note also that for any finite c, the equilibrium offer V 0 →p/µ-s as λ→∞. This is the competitive labour market outcome, in which workers capture the whole match surplus.
This may be contrasted with the case of unrestricted contracts, when for all values of λ the equilibrium step-contract is a wage equal to productivity and a fee delivering the whole surplus to the firm 11 .
Alternative Equilibrium Contracts
Finally for the homogeneous case, it is instructive to consider what alternatives to step-contracts may be used in equilibrium. In fact there is a wide range of possible equilibrium contracts; what these have in common is that their value to the worker rises with tenure, sufficiently steeply to deter turnover. In order to describe the equilibrium contracts, define: provides a lower bound for the value profile of contracts that can be used in equilibrium.
11 With unrestricted contracts and an infinite meeting rate there is a continuum of additional equilibria. A wage equal to productivity together with any fee that shares the rent between worker and firm can be an equilibrium contract. This indeterminacy happens because there are fixed numbers of homogenous firms and workers and a positive rent even when frictions disappear. When there is perfect competition between workers for jobs, and between firms for workers, the "competitive equilibrium" does not determine the sharing of the rent.
Proposition 5 12 states that any wage profile that has initial value V 0 , and subsequently higher value than U, is an alternative to the step-contract with initial value V 0 . The lower boundary of the region is given by the function U. To see the intuition behind Proposition 5, suppose that all firms are using a particular contract C 0 within the shaded region. Because the value rises with tenure, employed workers will not accept alternative offers of C 0 . Hence there is no turnover, and there is a steady state distribution of job tenure determined by the rates at which workers meet firms and retire. The value-tenure profile is sufficiently steep to make the distribution of reservation values of employed workers unfavourable for firms considering deviating from C 0 . There is a low probability of meeting an employed worker who will accept a low offer. So it is better to use C 0 , which recruits unemployed workers cheaply and keeps them forever, than to offer contracts of value high enough to attract significant numbers of employed workers.
The upper boundary of the equilibrium region corresponds to the most steeplyrising contract that is possible given the lower bound on the wage, which is the stepcontract. Figure 2(b) shows the wage profiles corresponding to the two boundaries. Note that the indeterminacy in wage profiles arises from the assumption of risk neutrality. With risk-averse workers the flatter wage profile corresponding to U would be preferred to the step-contract. A reasonable conjecture would be that in this case there would be a unique equilibrium contract flat enough to be attractive to workers but steep enough to deter turnover.
Heterogeneous firms
In the homogeneous case tenure-related contracts enhance the efficiency of matching in the labour market by eliminating job-to-job turnover. When firms differ in productivity, the use of contracts with tenure-related payments has different implications. 12 Proposition 5 is proved for restricted contracts, but the alternative contracts for the unrestricted case are For socially efficient job choices it is necessary that there is an increasing relationship between the worker's valuation of a contract and the present value of his productivity.
Burdett and Mortensen's model, with constant productivity, no turnover costs, and firms restricted to constant wages, has this property. When there are high and low productivity firms, each type randomises over a distribution of wages, but these distributions are nonoverlapping: a worker in a low productivity firm who meets a high productivity firm will always receive a better offer.
But from Propositions 1 and 2 we know that step-contracts, in which the worker's value rises with tenure, are optimal. With heterogeneous firms this will lead, in general, to inefficient matching, because a worker's response to alternative offers will depend on his tenure in the current match, although this has no effect on his relative productivity. Thus, for example, a worker with high tenure in a low-productivity match may refuse an offer from a high-productivity firm because of its low initial value.
In this section we will examine equilibrium turnover when there are two types of firms; half of them with high productivity, and half with low productivity: 
The inequalities ensure that it is socially optimal for unemployed workers to move into employment with either type of firm, and for workers employed in 1-firms to move to 2-firms when a meeting occurs. Applying Proposition 3, it is sufficient for the analysis of turnover to look at equilibria in step-contracts.
Equilibrium in Unrestricted Contracts
With unrestricted step-contracts, the wage is always equal to productivity, so there can be no movement of workers between firms with the same productivity. The inequalities in (12) ensure that all firms can make positive profit, and u=µ/(µ+λ). 1-firms recruit only from unemployment, and offer contracts of initial value V u . The only job-tojob turnover that is possible in equilibrium is from 1-matches to 2-matches. Furthermore, if such turnover occurs, it must be achieved by 2-firms offering contracts of initial value equal to J*(p 1 ) (or rather, infinitesimally more). For workers in 1-firms earn a wage equal to p 1 and hence will not accept less, and 2-firms cannot both attract more workers and revealed by letting c→-∞.
make positive profit with a higher offer. Alternatively, 2-firms may find it better to offer a contract that only attracts unemployed workers.
Thus, there are two possible types of equilibrium: a separating equilibrium, in which 1-firms offer contracts of initial value V u and 2-firms offer contracts of initial value J*(p 1 ); and a pooling equilibrium, in which both types offer contracts of initial value V u .
Clearly, the first of these has socially-optimal matching of workers to firms, whereas in the second, turnover is inefficiently low. Proposition 5 shows that either of these equilibria can exist, depending on the parameters, and identifies the conditions required for efficient turnover.
PROPOSITION 6:
When there are two types of firms, as defined by (12), and contract choice is unrestricted, an efficient full-turnover equilibrium exists if and only if:
Otherwise there is a zero-turnover equilibrium in which workers enter firms from unemployment and do not leave.
PROOF: See appendix
The inequality (13) can be compared with the condition for job-to-job turnover to be socially optimal, which can be written as:
In equilibrium, job-to-job turnover occurs only if the value of the productivity profile in 2-firms exceeds that in 1-firms by a positive margin, that depends on the parameters of the matching process. The outcome with no job-to-job turnover occurs when the meeting rate λ is low (relative to the retirement rate µ). In this case it is less worthwhile for highproductivity firms to try to attract workers from low productivity firms. They find it more profitable to offer contracts of low initial value, attracting unemployed workers only, and keeping them until retirement.
Note that turnover inefficiency is not related to the presence of turnover costs. The equilibrium condition (13) involves a comparison of the same measures of productivity as the social optimum condition (14). When there are costs of turnover, a contract with an entry fee and a wage equal to productivity is an appropriate response; what Proposition 6 tells us is that firms will "over-use" this form of contract, to reduce turnover below the socially desirable level.
Equilibrium in Restricted Contracts
When firms are not able to charge entry fees or use very low initial wages, their ability to extract rent is reduced, as we saw in section 4.2. Since the turnover inefficiency in Proposition 5 arises from the firms' use of entry fees to extract rent, we might expect that restrictions on their ability to do this would enhance the efficiency of matching.
In the unrestricted case, equilibria had either efficient full-turnover, or zeroturnover. With restricted contracts it is also possible to have equilibria with partialturnover, in which higher productivity firms offer contracts of value high enough to attract workers of low tenure in low productivity firms, but not those of high tenure.
The full model is algebraically complex in this case, so we will simplify by assuming, first, that there are no turnover costs, and second that the restrictions take the severest possible form: c=b. For an efficient equilibrium, it must be the case that all firms of the same type offer the same contract, and that the contract offered by a 2-firm is sufficient to attract any worker in a 1-firm contract. Conversely, zero-turnover occurs if and only if all firms offer the same contract. To find these equilibria, and intermediate < . An offer T=0 is a contract of value V 01 , and an offer 0<T≤ T 1 would attract any worker with current effective tenure less than T in either of these contracts. A 2-firm could offer a contract with T> T 1 , which would attract all workers in 1-firms, as well as those in 2-firms with lower tenure.
By analysing the equilibria in tenure choices in such contracts, we obtain the following results:
PROPOSITION 7: When there are two types of firms, as defined by (12), no turnover costs (s 1 = s 2 = 0), and firms are restricted to w≥b:
there is no zero-turnover equilibrium;
(ii) an efficient full-turnover equilibrium exists if and only if:
(iii) otherwise there is a partial-turnover equilibrium in which some, or all, high productivity firms offer contracts that are not acceptable to workers of high tenure in low productivity firms.
PROOF: See Appendix
The critical value of relative productivity above which full turnover occurs is lower than in the unrestricted case. Thus, the restrictions on contracts facilitate efficient matching: full turnover occurs for a wider range of parameters, and even where it does not, there is partial turnover. As in the unrestricted case, the outcome depends on relative productivity and on the meeting rate relative to the retirement rate, λ/µ. Figure 3 shows how conditions (14) and (15) partition the parameter space, to compare equilibrium turnover in the two cases.
Discussion

Relaxing Some Assumptions
In order to obtain a straightforward characterisation of the equilibrium contracts we have made some very simple technological assumptions: that firms have constant returns to scale, and that workers are identical in their utility from unemployment. Together these imply that the match rent p-b is independent of the employment rate. In principle there is no difficulty in relaxing either, or both, of these assumptions. Then, the equilibrium contracts are still upward sloping. Due to the existence of frictions the value of unemployment to the marginal employed worker lies strictly below the value of his productivity, and contracts slope upwards between these two values. Assuming that workers' reservation utilities are not observed by firms, and they are still therefore required to offer all workers the same contract, there would be an additional inefficiency:
unemployment would be higher than the frictional level because some workers would never accept employment offers despite potential gains from trade. Burdett and Mortensen demonstrated this type of unemployment inefficiency for the wage-posting equilibrium with heterogeneous workers.
A critical feature of the model is that the firm must offer the same contract to every worker. This follows from the assumption that the firm cannot observe anything about the worker that would help it to assess his reservation value. Since it may seem implausible that the firm cannot even observe whether the worker is employed, consider the effect of supposing that firms could make different offers to employed and unemployed workers. In the homogeneous case with unrestricted contracts there would still be no turnover in equilibrium, but the only equilibrium contract would have an entrance fee and wage equal to productivity. With restricted contracts, upward-sloping contracts would be used but there would be some (inefficient) turnover in equilibrium. Unemployed workers would obtain lower value offers than employed workers and turnover would occur when an employed worker met another firm soon after recruitment from unemployment, while the value of his contract was still low.
In the heterogeneous case, knowledge of employment status would destroy the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 5, and turnover would be efficient. However, precisely the same kind of turnover inefficiency would reappear if there were three or more (rather than two) types of firm, provided that firms were unable to observe the productivity of a worker's current match. The implications of these results are discussed further below.
Interpretation of the Results
The equilibrium contracts in the model of this paper can be interpreted as internal labour market strategies. Matches have specific value because of the time lags in finding alternative partners, and this provides an incentive to adopt long-term contracts. Firms offer contracts that are privately efficient: they maximise the joint value of a match. The consequence is low labour market turnover, with wages increasing with tenure and some or all workers remaining in the same firm throughout their careers. Thus, the model can be interpreted as establishing that internal labour markets are likely to develop when:
• there is little uncertainty about productivity 13 ;
• workers can move from firm to firm but receive information slowly about other jobs;
• firms have little information about the alternative opportunities available to workers.
13 If, on the other hand, productivity were subject to shocks, it would not be optimal to pay high wages expost, and the outcome would be quite different.
In these circumstances it is optimal for firms to offer contracts whose value rises with tenure, and they can do this even when workers are severely credit constrained.
Although these strategies are privately efficient, they may result in too little turnover for the socially efficient matching of workers to jobs. Using entry fees or other forms of tenure-related contract is an effective means of rent-extraction for the firm. It is a form of monopsonistic price discrimination, competing on different terms in the markets for new and existing workers. In the full information case (section 2.1) the firm can discriminate perfectly, extracting all the rent with no adverse effect on aggregate output.
With asymmetric information and hence anonymous contracts, in the homogeneous case (section 4) it succeeds in discriminating perfectly in equilibrium, and again, the outcome is efficient. But when firms differ in productivity (section 5), they are no longer able to price-discriminate perfectly. The best that they can achieve is third-degree price discrimination in which different wages are used in the internal and external markets, and the effect is to give the wrong signals to workers, reducing aggregate output.
Furthermore, conditions or institutions that restrict the firms' ability to pricediscriminate (imperfectly) are beneficial, in that they promote efficient matching. When workers are unable to accept contracts involving very low wages because of creditconstraints, firms cannot use steeply-rising contracts. Effectively, the workers' bargaining power is increased, and firms have less monopsony power. A minimum wage, and legal restrictions on bonding, have similar effects. We cannot, however, conclude that rising wage-tenure contracts are always indicative of monopsony power. For efficient matching, positive turnover costs (or other forms of specific capital that increase productivity with tenure) must be reflected in the contract.
More generally, the possibility of price discrimination in frictional labour market models suggests an efficiency rationale for social conventions of fairness which dictate the payment of "a wage for the job" rather than allowing firms to tailor contracts more closely to individual circumstances (where these do not affect productivity). In section 6.1 we briefly considered the effects of allowing firms to offer different contracts to employed and unemployed workers. If this enables firms to price-discriminate perfectly, it can improve efficiency; when it does not so, providing further opportunities for firms to engage in third-degree price discrimination can worsen the outcome. Individual contracts are privately and socially efficient when firms are fully informed about the individual. 
Since [ ]
where Γ is defined in Lemma A1.
( ) V T >J*(c) and (v,p,c) , with step-up pointT . 
Suppose that, in a Nash equilibrium, F(v) is the distribution of offers and P(v) is the probability of acceptance. If F and P do not change, we know that every firm is indifferent between its equilibrium contract choice and the step-contract of the same initial value. Suppose that every firm making an acceptable offer switches to the equivalent step-contract. We will show that this is also an equilibrium.
Since the step-contracts have the same initial values, F is unchanged and so is 
Hence the measure of workers with reservation values less than v remains the same; that is,~( ) ( ) .
So any firm outside η earns the same profit as in the original equilibrium if it uses the same initial value v 0 . If it changed its offer to v, it would get
0 so v 0 is still optimal. So no firm outside η has an incentive to change its initial offer. Since η is of measure zero, this must be an equilibrium. ! 14 If firms of positive measure make offers at a point or over an interval, then by definition F increases there.
PROOF of LEMMA 5: When employed workers have step contracts, only unemployed workers accept offers of R u so G(R u )=u. Equating flows in and out of the stock of unemployed workers gives the expression for u. For R≥ R u , G(R+dt ) is the stock of unemployed workers and employed workers with current tenure less than R+dt. The number entering this stock in a time period of length dt is (1-G(R+dt ))µdt, the workers with higher tenure who are replaced by unemployed workers. In steady state this is equal to the number leaving, which (ignoring terms of order dt 2 ) is given by:
The first term is the employed workers whose tenure increases beyond R+dt, and the second is those who accept offers of higher tenure. Equating these two flows gives:
Letting dt→0 gives the result. ! PROOF of PROPOSITION 4: ∏ is continuous and right-differentiable, and: 
Step 1: Suppose there is an interval [R L , R H ) on which H is continuous and strictly increasing. All points in the interval must be optimal for some firm, so
there is no such interval.
Step 2: Now suppose there is more than one mass point. Let R L and R H be the two mass points at lowest values of R. On [R L , R H ), H is constant so ′ Y and ′ Π are differentiable:
In an equilibrium with positive profits,
is a contradiction, and the proof of (i) is complete.
Step 3: For (ii), suppose there is a single mass point R 0 of mass 1. To demonstrate the necessary and sufficient conditions for this to be an equilibrium is algebraically messy but straightforward. From (9):
From Lemma 5:
This system can be solved explicitly for Y and G, to obtain Π(R).
Then, R 0 is an equilibrium if and only if the following conditions hold 15 :
From the solution for Π we obtain
Combining this with the four conditions above gives the conditions in (ii).
Step 4 
. It can then be verified as in the proof of (ii) that Step1: Using (10) and (5) : 
Step 2: Let G(T) be the steady-state measure of employed workers with tenure less than or equal to T, plus the unemployed, who effectively have tenure zero. G(T) satisfies 
(T) > U(T). U is a continuous and strictly increasing
function of tenure, so the steady-state distribution of workers' contract valuations, P(V),
and hence:
If firm offers a contract of higher initial value V>U(0), the expected payoff is:
Step 3: We already know from Proposition 4 that no firm can make higher profits by offering a contract of lower initial value. Finally, no other contract of initial value U(0)
can give higher payoff than C 0 , since it keeps the worker for ever. So it is a Nash equilibrium for all firms to offer C 0 . !
PROOF of PROPOSITION 6:
Step 1: In a full-turnover equilibrium, a 2-firm offers a contract worth J*(p 1 ) and attracts both unemployed workers and workers already in 1-matches; and a 1-firm offers a contract worth V u .
So from equation ( Step 2: The condition for this equilibrium to exist is that p 2 -firms prefer to offer contracts worth J*(p 1 ) rather than V u . Comparing these gives condition (13).
Contracts worth
Step 3: In a zero-turnover equilibrium, both p 1 -firms and p 2 -firms offer a contract worth V u that attracts unemployed workers only. As before equation (1) Step 4: This equilibrium exists if 2-firms prefer to offer contracts worth V u rather than contracts worth J*(p 1 ).
Contracts worth J*(p 1 ) give payoff: ( ) • all 1-firms offer T=0 in S V p b ( , ,
) in which the wage rises at T 1 ;
• a fraction f of 2-firms offer T 2 in S V p b ( , ,
) in which the wage rises at T 2 ;
• the remaining 2-firms offer
; where 0≤T L < T 1 ≤T 2 < T 2 . It is convenient to write k q ≡ λ µ and: Step 2: Value functions Let X i (T) and V i (T) be the payoffs for firm i and its workers at tenure T. Let r i = p i -c. Then: 
